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Abstract 
The competition on e-commerce platforms has become more and more fierce. Among 
all the different promotion strategies, sales fraud, which is a practice inflating sale 
volume by using fictitious transactions, is an open secret among e-commerce sellers. 
Sales fraud will fundamentally undermine the credibility of sales volume, which is 
one of the major information source for decision making in online purchasing. To 
shed light on this phenomenon, we empirically investigate circumstance under which 
sales fraud will take place, using a comprehensive dataset from a mainstream e-
commerce website in China. We find that sales cheating is more likely to take place 
for those products with lower price, from lower-level shops, in their early stages, but 
with good sales potential. Our empirical findings provide important contributions to 
the literature on e-commerce, and offer critical managerial implications to online 
retailers, e-commerce platforms, and consumers. 
Keywords: Sales cheating, Online fraud, Sales volume, Electronic commerce 
 
Introduction 
The advancement of e-commerce has made it easier for a wide range of retailers to market all over the 
world (Grandon & Pearson, 2004; Jarvenpaa et al., 2000). According to a report by eMarketer, in 
2017, the worldwide e-commerce sales continue to increase at 23.2% to $2.290 trillion, accounting for 
more than one-tenth of the total retail sales worldwide. On e-commerce platforms, consumers can get 
easy access to prior consumers’ purchases through the information of previous sales volume, which is 
a major factor influencing consumer purchasing decision (Cai et al., 2009; Chen & Xie, 2008). 
However, sellers can manipulate the sales information by fraud sales. To be specific, the common 
practice for fraud sales is as follows: first, the vendor finds cheaters and pays them the cost of the 
products they need to cheat on and an additional amount of fee as an award; second, the cheaters place 
orders for the products and pay with the money they got from the vendor in advance; third, the vendor 
delivers parcels that are empty but with a tracking number to outtrick the platform; lastly, the cheaters 
confirm the receipt of the products.  
Although websites have their filtering algorithm to identify suspicious orders and to punish involved 
sellers, they do not deduct fake orders from the displayed sales volume. That is, when sales cheating 
takes place, sales volume information will not reflect the real purchasing from previous consumers. 
Although illegally and explicitly forbidden by most e-commerce platforms, this type of sales cheating 
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is pervasive in e-commerce. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that 17% of all merchants 
on Taobao, the largest C2C e-commerce website in China, had faked 500 million transactions in 2013 
(Wong et al., 2015).  
As sale fraud is getting more and more prevalent in e-commerce, the fraud sales may cause some 
damage to consumers, sellers, and platforms. For example, sales fraud will mislead consumers 
because ordinary people do not directly observe whether an order is fake or not. Moreover, sellers 
who commit the sales cheating have the risk of losing reputation and face the potential of punishment. 
However, many sellers still insist on doing cheating behaviors.  
Little research, however, has been conducted to study the nature of this type of online fraud. To fill in 
the research gap, we would like to explore when and why sellers cheat on certain products, and 
specifically what are the characteristics of products that will make sellers choose them to commit 
sales fraud. Answering these questions will contribute to the literature in several ways. First, to our 
knowledge, this study will constitute the first effort to study the online sales fraud behavior. Second, 
our results may help deepen the understanding of fraud motivation in the online purchase 
environment; thereby we could provide several insights on how to avoid such kind of fraud behaviour 
in this environment.  
In this study, we answer the above research questions via a rich panel dataset obtained from a famous 
e-commerce website in China on 317,494 products from May 1st 2017 to July 31st 2017. We identify 
some factors that will influence sales cheating engagement. Specifically, our results show that, on 
average, sales cheating is more likely to take place for those products with lower price, from lower-
level shops, in their early stage, but with good sales potential. Our additional investigations of the 
contingent factors find that the impact of product-level sales potential on sales cheating engagement 
would be stronger with longer on shelf time, but the impact of shop-level characteristics on fraud 
engagement will be weaker if products are on shelf for a longer time. 
Related Literature 
The Internet economy has made it easier for consumers to get access to various information, e.g. other 
customers’ purchasing and crowd opinion, which cannot be obtained easily from offline channels. 
However, due to the inherent characteristics of online context, online fraud is ubiquitous in e-
commerce. For example, a recent stream of studies have begun to pay attention to the reliability of 
online reviews, such as objectivity (Goes et al., 2014), and some of them have concerned the problem 
of fake reviews (Lappas et al., 2016; Luca & Zervas, 2016). Luca and Zervas (2016)) found that 
nearly 16% of restaurant reviews are fake in Yelp.com, and fake reviews are more likely to take place 
when a restaurant has a low reputation. Using hotel data across 17 cities, Lappas et al. (2016)) found 
that even limited injections of fake reviews can have a significant effect on online visibility of hotels 
on online hotel websites. 
While extensive research effort has been devoted to examining the role of sales volume  (Chen et al., 
2011; Hanson & Putler, 1996; Zhang, 2010), most of them focus on its positive effect in assisting 
decision making. Another stream of research has concerned the possible negative effects of sales 
volume. For example, Salganik et al. (2006)) argued that sales volume can be unreliable as it may be 
caused by randomness from early adopters of products. Other researchers also stated that previous 
sales volume can be misleading as it simply reflects other consumers’ actions but fails to include the 
reasons behind their decisions (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 1998). 
However, no research has paid attention to the sales fraud behavior. Given that sales cheating has 
become increasingly common on many e-commerce platforms and served as a new strategy to boost 
sales by modifying information presented to consumers, examining the actual effect of this online 
fraud behavior becomes necessary, and we try to fill in this research gap in this study. 
Data 
To empirically address the above research questions, we obtain data from a mainstream e-commerce 
website in China. This website is an independent e-commerce platform that facilitates the transactions 
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between individual retailers/stores and consumers. There are numerous online stores on this platform, 
and each store itself can decide what products to sell. While sales cheating is forbidden, it is 
ubiquitous for almost every store on the platform. We randomly choose 2973 stores, and found that 
2965 (99.73%) of them have sales cheating records. With sophisticated models and algorithm, the 
platform can follow each order and decide whether it is a cheating order, but only when a certain 
amount of cheating was caught would the seller be punished. What’s more, when an order is 
confirmed as a cheating order, its review channel will be closed but this order will still be added to the 
product’s sales volume. That is to say, cheating in this platform will only change product sales 
volume information without changing product ratings.  
We obtained 2,593,868 observations for 317,494 products from May 1st, 2017 to July 31st, 2017. The 
information covers displayed product information (e.g. price, Detail Seller Rating etc.), transaction 
information. And the platform also provide us the cheating information for each product (i.e. cheating 
volume in each week). This thus provides us a convenient setting to observe and estimate factors that 
will influence one product to conduct sales cheating in one week but not the other product in another 
week. 
Model and Analysis 
Empirical Model 
Based on this panel-level dataset, we conduct our analysis at the product-week. Let subscript i denote 
each individual product in our dataset, and subscript t denote each week. To investigate factors that 
will influence products’ likelihood of engaging in sales cheating, our dependent variable, isCheatingit, 
is a binary indicator for sales cheating engagement. That is,  isCheatingit = 1 if product i has engaged 
in product cheating on week t, zero otherwise. Furthermore, we include several control variables and 
three sets of independent variables in our empirical models. The meanings of the main independent 
variables and control variables can be found in Table 1. 
Table 1 Variable Description 
Variables Description 
Control variables (CV) 
LC Whether the item has fraud sales in last week 
PB The price of the item in the beginning of this week 
TB The number of days since the item was first put on shelf 
SL The level of the shop in the beginning of this week 
PV The page view of the item in last week (log) 
Lag1-factors (LF) 
LSI The sales of the item in last week (log) 
LSS The sales of the shop in last week (log) 
LRI The average displayed ratings of the item in last week 
LRS The average displayed ratings of the shop in last week 
Historical factors (HF) 
HSI The historical sales of the item 
HSS The historical sales of the shop 
HRI The historical average ratings the item obtains 
HRS The historical average ratings the shop obtains 
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Incremental factors (IF) 
RII 
(The item displayed ratings in the beginning of the week-displayed 
ratings in the beginning of last week)/ displayed ratings in the beginning 
of last week 
RIS 
(The shop displayed ratings in the beginning of the week-displayed 
ratings in the beginning of last week)/ displayed ratings in the beginning 
of last week 
SII 
(The item sales in last week t-average item sales by last week)/ average 
item sales by last week 
SIS 
(The shop sales in last week t- average shop sales by last week)/ average 
shop sales by last week 
To address our research questions, we model the three sets of factors on sales cheating 
engagement separately. The panel-level linear model is specified in Equation (1)-(4): 
isCheatingit= β0+β1CVit+mt+αi+εit (1) 
isCheatingit= β0+β1CVit+ β2LFit+mt + αi+εit (2) 
isCheatingit= β0+β1CVit+ β2HFit+mt + αi+εit (3) 
isCheatingit= β0+ β1CVit+ β2IFit+mt+ αi+εit (4) 
where αi captures unobserved product-specific effect and mt denotes the month dummy variables.  
Results 
We first estimate a logit model of whether the product engages in sales cheating on all control 
variables. As reported in table 2, Column (1), various control variables have significant relationships 
with sales cheating engagement. Specifically, sales cheating is a strategy with continuity, thus sales 
cheating in the past week is positively related to the likelihood of sales cheating engagement in this 
week. Next, product price has a negative relationship with cheating engagement. This might be 
because as the price goes up, sellers need to pay more for hiring cheaters as they need to pay cheaters 
the cost of the products in advance. Product on shelf time is negatively related to cheating 
engagement. This is consistent with sellers’ original intention to conduct sales cheating: attracting 
buyers in an early stage of products. Higher-level shops are less likely to engage in cheating as they 
have more other means in boosting sales and cheating may do more harm than good to them (e.g. 
ruining their reputation). Moreover, comparing with those products with little page view, products 
with high page view are more likely involved in sales cheating. Overall, these significant relationships 
imply that our control variables have good explanatory power. 
Beyond the control variables, we then estimate other factors by including three more sets of other 
independent variables. We summarize the results in Table 2, Column (2)-(4). As indicated in Column 
(2), the coefficient of LSI, 0.763 (p < 0.001), is positive and statistically significant, suggesting a 
positive relationship with cheating engagement. On the contrary, the coefficient of LSS (β=-0.0870, p 
< 0.001) suggests a negative relationship with cheating engagement. Furthermore, both LRI 
(β=0.0708, p < 0.001) and LRS (β=0.125, p < 0.001) have a positive relationship with cheating 
engagement. The results are consistent if we use historical indicators instead of one-week-lag 
indicators, thus we may interpret the  results altogether as follows: sales cheating is more likely to 
take place for products that have potential, i.e., a good past sales or a good rating accumulated from 
past selling, however, sales cheating may be just an expedient strategy and when the overall sales of a 
shop is large enough it will avoid conducting sales cheating. This is consistent with the effect of shop 
level, which is highly correlated with overall sales. These effects are further consolidated by including 
incremental variables. As indicated in Table 2, Column (4), the coefficients of RII (β=0.165, p < 
0.001) and SIS (β=3.311, p < 0.01) are both significantly positive, suggesting that an increasing in 
product rating or sales, even a transitory one, will incur more sales cheating, and the larger the 
increasing the stronger the effects on sales cheating engagement. However, the coefficient of RIS (β=-
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0.194, p < 0.001) is significantly negative, suggesting that when the overall ratings of a shop increase, 
the products in this shop are less likely to be involved in sales fraud. 
Table 2 Results 
Variables 
(1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit (4) Logit 
Control Lag1-effect Historical-effect Incremental-
effect 
LC 1.178*** 0.518*** 1.119*** 1.239*** 
 (0.00802) (0.0106) (0.00943) (0.0117) 
PB -0.000539*** -0.000757*** -0.00396*** -0.00456*** 
 (0.0000663) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000137) 
TB -0.00860*** -0.00129*** -0.00749*** -0.00614*** 
 (0.000215) (0.000273) (0.000286) (0.000326) 
SL -0.103*** -0.0176*** -0.108*** -0.0972*** 
 (0.00319) (0.00510) (0.00427) (0.00497) 
PV 0.663*** 0.185*** 0.677*** 0.722*** 
 (0.00220) (0.00479) (0.00286) (0.00322) 
LSI  0.763***   
  (0.00625)   
LSS  -0.0870***   
  (0.00450)   
LRI  0.0708***   
  (0.00934)   
LRS  0.125***   
  (0.0294)   
HSI   0.000589***  
   (0.0000216)  
HSS   -0.00000138*  
   (0.000000543)  
HRI   0.154***  
   (0.00755)  
HRS   0.201***  
   (0.00781)  
RII    0.165** 
    (0.0578) 
RIS    -0.194** 
    (0.0709) 
SII    0.0627 
    (0.0525) 
SIS    3.311*** 
    (0.491) 
constant -4.047*** -2.475*** -5.378*** -4.022*** 
 (0.0139) (0.134) (0.0485) (0.0278) 
time 
dummies 
-included- -included- -included- -included- 
N 1911186 540035 1146523 882212 
pseudo R2 0.298 0.287 0.350 0.379 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Contingent Factors: Product On-shelf Time 
After identifying some factors that will influence sales engagement, we further explore potential 
contingent factors which may moderate the identified relationships. We expect that the factors may 
exert different influence basing on the stages of the product. To empirically analyse these moderating 
effects, we construct and include the interaction terms in our model estimation. As show in Table 3, 
the estimates of TB*LSI, TB*LSS, TB*LRI are all positive and significant. These results thus indicate 
that as the product is at its later stage, the effect of product sales and displayed ratings in the past 
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week on sales cheating engagement will be stronger, while the effect of shop sales in the past week 
will be weaker. That is, when an product is on shelf for longer time, shop level characteristics will 
exert weaker influence, but if the product still has good sales potential, it is very likely to be involved 
in sales cheating. We get similar results if we use historical indicators, product on shelf time also 
negatively moderates the relationship between sales cheating engagement and historical shop sales 
and ratings. However, we get opposite results for HSI and HRI: product on shelf time negatively 
moderates the relationship between sales cheating engagement and historical product sales but 
positively moderates the relationship between sales cheating engagement and historical product 
ratings. We believe the reason behind is as follows: comparing with historical ratings, historical sales 
is a weaker indicator of product potential, thus, as more days a product is on shelf, the positive effect 
of past sales will be weaker, but if the product still has high ratings, indicating a long-lasting potential, 
the incurring effect will be even stronger.  
Table 3 Interaction Effects  
Variables 
(1) Logit (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit 
control Lag1-effect Historical-effect Incremental-effect 
LC 1.179*** 0.517*** 1.115*** 1.239*** 
 (0.00798) (0.0106) (0.00948) (0.0117) 
PB -0.000482*** -0.000711*** -0.00397*** -0.00456*** 
 (0.0000625) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000137) 
TB -0.0281*** -0.00372 -0.00119 -0.00608*** 
 (0.000504) (0.00707) (0.00272) (0.000328) 
SL -0.101*** -0.0159** -0.103*** -0.0973*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00514) (0.00431) (0.00497) 
PV 0.522*** 0.183*** 0.678*** 0.722*** 
 (0.00377) (0.00480) (0.00291) (0.00322) 
TB*PV 0.00495***    
 (0.000112)    
LSI  0.695***   
  (0.00834)   
LSS  -0.124***   
  (0.00774)   
LRI  0.0290   
  (0.0162)   
LRS  0.157***   
  (0.0435)   
TB* LSI  0.00230***   
  (0.000193)   
TB* LSS  0.00129***   
  (0.000214)   
TB* LRI  0.00180**   
  (0.000590)   
TB* LRS  -0.00278   
  (0.00157)   
HSI   0.000893***  
   (0.0000605)  
HSS   -0.0000126***  
   (0.00000140)  
HRI   0.0795***  
   (0.0138)  
HRS   0.284***  
   (0.0120)  
TB* HSI   -0.00000594***  
   (0.00000105)  
TB* HSS   0.000000219***  
   (2.47e-08)  
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TB* HRI   0.00272***  
   (0.000436)  
TB* HRS   -0.00452***  
   (0.000459)  
RII    -0.0875 
    (0.125) 
RIS    -0.0900 
    (0.165) 
SII    0.168 
    (0.115) 
SIS    4.470*** 
    (1.085) 
TB* RII    0.00917* 
    (0.00398) 
TB* RIS    -0.00289 
    (0.00419) 
TB* SII    -0.00398 
    (0.00391) 
TB* SIS    -0.0328 
    (0.0270) 
constant -3.533*** -2.234*** -5.373*** -4.023*** 
 (0.0176) (0.204) (0.0807) (0.0279) 
time 
dummies 
-included- -included- -included- -included- 
N 1911186 540035 1146523 882212 
pseudo R2 0.300 0.287 0.350 0.379 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
We further corroborate our findings by checking the robustness and consistency in multiple ways. 
Most of findings remain consistent.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our research object was to shed light on sales fraud, a phenomenon ignored by extant research, by 
identifying when and why sellers commit sales cheating in e-commerce, specifically the 
characteristics of products that will make sellers choose them to commit sales fraud. Using a rich 
dataset from a large e-commerce website, we identify several factors that will influence product sales 
cheating engagement. Our results show that, on average, sellers are more likely to commit sales 
cheating on those products with lower price, from lower-level shops, in their early stages, but with 
good sales potential. Our additional investigations of the contingent factors find that in a later stage of 
a product, the impact of product-level sales potential on sales cheating engagement would be stronger, 
but the impact of shop-level characteristics on fraud engagement will be weaker. 
Our findings make several contributions to the literature on e-commerce. This is one of the first 
studies to investigate sales cheating behavior. It also helps understand the nature of this kind of 
cheating behavior. From a practical perspective, our study reminds consumers not to rely too much on 
sales volume when making purchasing decisions, but to take other information (e.g. product review) 
into consideration. Our results provide some insights why shops want to commit sales fraud behavior. 
For example, they may want to boost sales and promote some products with high potential. Platforms 
should consider various ways for shops to promote their high-potential products; thereby shops may 
not rely on sales fraud to boost sales and promote products. 
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